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Teska and Tillman: Whirlwind: The Air War against Japan, 1942–1945

of area bombing and the decision to
pursue the unconditional surrender of
Germany; and Fritz Allhoff ’s “Physicians at War: Lessons for Archaeologists?” looks at ethical dilemmas of
medical professionals with respect to
military ethics, medical ethics, and torture in an endeavor to provide insight
and parallels for other professions.
Whether one is interested in archeology
and cultural preservation in a war zone,
the archeology of military and battle
sites, the erection of military monuments, or considerations for military
planners and those who subsequently
execute their plans in combat zones,
there is much to consider in this book.
The final chapter consists of a series
of responses from archeologists to
queries concerning relations between
them and the military during the
war in Iraq. Some of the respondents
have had experiences both in Iraq and
with the military, and some have not.
However, the respondents all have
connections with the preservation of
cultural heritage, and their comments
show that professionals outside the
military must also evaluate the ethics
of their own disciplines with respect
to war. For example, should a member
of a community outside the military,
such as an archeologist, provide information and advice before a conflict
commences, or only later? Though
these are not questions for the military
professional, military professionals
should be aware of them. Stone is to
be commended for bringing together
in a single volume essays and perspectives on this important issue. Interested
readers will not be disappointed.
TIMOTHY J. DEMY
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Tillman, Barrett. Whirlwind: The Air War against
Japan, 1942–1945. New York: Simon & Schuster,
2010. 336pp. $28

Over sixty years after its conclusion, the
air war that was waged against Japan
remains one of the most controversial and brutal campaigns conducted
by any of the Allied powers during
World War II. The debate centers on
the questions of the morality and
necessity of the bombing campaign
against Japan, primarily its cities,
that culminated in the dropping of
two atomic bombs, and whether the
campaign hastened the end of the war.
In his richly detailed and well written
Whirlwind, Barrett Tillman addresses
these two arguments and the decision making that led the United States
to wage aerial war. He starts by laying the groundwork with the surprise
bombing of Tokyo by U.S. Army Air
Forces (USAAF) B-25s led by Lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle in April
1942, relating how Japan’s leaders,
shocked at the audacity of the carrierborne attack on the home islands,
moved forward with a complex plan
to eliminate the U.S. Pacific Fleet once
and for all, thus setting the stage for
Japan’s strategic loss at the battle of
Midway less than two months later.
However, the USAAF and its chief,
General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, had
bigger plans of their own for Japan.
Arnold, a disciple and friend of General
Billy Mitchell, resolutely believed in the
power of strategic bombing to bring
about an enemy’s surrender. The Royal
Air Force and USAAF had thoroughly
tested this theory in the skies over
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Germany, with mixed results. Despite
a relentless and costly air campaign,
the German Wehrmacht could only be
defeated on the ground. A basic concept
of strategic-bombing theory held that
heavy civilian casualties would force
enemy leaders to sue for peace, but
the theorists and practitioners did not
factor in the callous nature of despotic
leaders who cared little for the welfare
of their citizenry. (For more information on this subject see Among the Dead
Cities: The History and Moral Legacy
of the WWII Bombing of Civilians in
Germany and Japan, by A. C. Grayling.)
Japan was a different story. Arnold
envisioned unleashing the as-yetunfielded B-29 Superfortresses on
Japan en masse. The USAAF first tried
conducting operations from China, but
that proved untenable for a variety of
reasons. Eventually airfields on Guam,
Saipan, and Tinian, islands that were
taken at great cost, came into existence for sustained B-29 operations.
The air war against Japan was much
more than the story of B-29 raids on
Tokyo and other targets. One littleknown operation went under the dark
moniker of Operation STARVATION, the
deployment of aerial mines by B-29s.
These sorties proved quite effective
in whittling down Japan’s merchant
marine, thus devastating Japan’s morale
and eroding its capability for war production. USAAF crews delivered twelve
thousand mines, sinking 293 ships
between March and April 1945. Yet for
all the successes that the United States
had in the skies over Japan, the USAAF
and U.S. Navy cooperated little in the
planning and implementation of the
overall campaign. Each service pursued
its own air operations, the Army going
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after Japan’s cities and the Navy after
Japan’s fleet and coastal shipping.
Tillman’s excellent book is well researched and well written. He reintroduces the reader to the pivotal leaders
who played a role in the execution of
the air war on Japan. He rounds out
his narrative with accounts from B-29
aircrews and naval aviators who flew at
the tip of the spear aimed at Japan; their
observations and recollections add an
excellent sense of humanity to the story.
His account also serves to validate joint
operations, a lesson borne out by the
experience of this war and one that our
military continues to observe today.
This book will not end the debate on the
value and moral justification of the U.S.
air war on Japan. Tillman clearly makes
the point that while the air war against
Japan did not end the conflict on its
own, it did affect Japan’s ability to continue to wage war. In the end it is clear
that Japan was willing to fight despite
the destruction of its cities and that it
was preparing mightily for the expected
invasion of the home islands. However,
it was the atomic attacks on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki that finally forced Japan
to seek peace and end the slaughter.
CDR. DAVID L. TESKA, U.S. COAST GUARD RESERVE

San Diego, California

Jordan, Jonathan W. Brothers, Rivals, Victors:
Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley, and the Partnership
That Drove the Allied Conquest in Europe. New
York: NAL Caliber, 2011. 672pp. $28.95

This is an exceptional book. Although
it has its share of strategy, logistics,
and technology, it is primarily a book
about relationships and leadership.
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